Seminario de microeconomía aplicada 12: Myopia and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D
Calendario de actividades
Universidad de Arizona
We structurally estimate the dynamic model using maximum likelihood. We find that, for the full sample of Part D enrollees, behavioral hazard increases enrollee spending by 44%. A counterfactual policy that closed the coverage gap in a revenue-neutral way would require 42% coinsurance.
Organizadores: Banco de la República- Cali, en asocio con el Congreso de la Asociación Colombiana de Economía de la Salud
Fecha: Jueves, 19 de febrero
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