

Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts

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A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

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